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1974 DEVELOPMENTS IN WELFARE LAW-AID
TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN
In a year marked by a shrinking national economy and pleas
from public officials for reduced welfare expenditures,' the federal
government exhibited a mixed response to state efforts to pare
from their welfare rolls recipients of Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC). State devices to narrow the scope of ben-
efits included restrictive legislation and regulations designed to
limit the class of eligible recipients,2 reduce error and fraud,3
disregard actual needs of potential recipients in favor of statistical
averages, 4 and compel recipients to assist in locating alternative
sources of support.5 These efforts were often met by judicial
activity to protect AFDC recipients from the consequences of
financial and administrative exigencies, 6 which in turn was coun-
tered by restrictive legislative and administrative action by the
federal government.7 This Note surveys these 1974 developments
in the AFDC program.8
I
CONTROL OVER STATE ADMINISTRATION OF AFDC PROGRAMS
There were significant developments in 1974 in federal efforts
to reduce error and fraud in payments channeled through feder-
ally subsidized welfare programs. By passage and implementation
I N.Y. Times, July 3, 1974, at 35, col. 1; id., June 4, 1974, at 22, col. 8; id., April 5,
1974, at 74, col. 5, 8; id., March 31, 1974, at 22, col. 4; id., March 6, 1974, at 15, col. 4.
2 See notes 56-85 and accompanying text infra.
3 See notes 9-19 and accompanying text infra.
4 See notes 20-55 and accompanying text infra.
' See notes 86-124 and accompanying text infra.
6 See, e.g., Van Lare v. Hurley, 43 U.S.L.W. 4592 (U.S. May 19, 1975); Shea v.
Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974); Alcala v. Bums, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), revd, 95 S.
Ct. 1180 (1975); Shirley v. Lavine, 365 F. Supp. 8.18 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. Lascaris v. Shirley, 95 S. Ct. 1190 (1975); Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn.
1973),prob.juris. noted sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 415 U.S. 912 (1974) (No. 73-6033); Uhrovick
v. Lavine, 43 App. Div. 2d 481, 352 N.Y.S.2d 529 (3d Dep't), affd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 892, 324
N.E.2d 360, 364 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1974).
7 Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1975) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); 45 C.F.R. § 233.10 (1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 37,195, amending 45 C.F.R.
§ 205.40 (1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 37,195, amending 45 C.F.R. § 205.41 (1974); 45 C.F.R.
§ 205.10 (1974); id. § 206.10.
8 The following survey parallels in format and serves to update Developments in Welfare
Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859 (1974).
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of new regulations, 9 HEW attempted to improve quality control
over administration of the AFDC program. The Department set
stringent standards for allowable state errors in such areas as the
provision of assistance to ineligibles and the overpayment of ben-
efits to eligible recipients.10 Should states exceed these tolerance
levels, automatic financial penalties will be imposed."
When these quality control standards were first proposed,
there was strong negative reaction against the harshness of the
penalties and the potential infringement on the due process rights
of recipients. 12 Nevertheless, with slight modifications,' 3 the ad-
ministrative regulations were adopted, and there is some evidence
that they are achieving their desired effect of reducing unautho-
rized expenditures and diminishing the number of ineligible recipi-
ents.14
9 39 Fed. Reg. 37,195, amending 45 C.F.R. §§205.40-.41 (1974) (quality control and
reduction in payment error); 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1974) (requirements for hearings); id.
§ 206.10 (application and determination of eligibility); id. § 233.10 (coverage and eligibility).
10 States must reach a target of a 3% tolerance level for ineligibility, a 5% tolerance level
for overpayments, and a 5% tolerance level for underpayments. Tolerance level, for
purposes of the regulation, is the percentage of cases in error. If we presume a "base period
error rate" calculated from the periods April 1, 1973 to September 30, 1973 and January 1,
1974 to June 30, 1974, the reduction in error must meet the following schedule:
(i) By December 31, 1974, one-half of the difference between the base period
error rates and the 3 and 5 percent tolerance levels; and
(ii) By June 30, 1975, all of the difference between the base period error rates and
the 3 and 5 percent tolerance levels ...
39 Fed. Reg. 37,196, amending 45 C.F.R. § 205.40 (1974).
"' 39 Fed. Reg. 37,195, amending 45 C.F.R. § 205.41 (1974), provides that if a state does
not meet its target error rates, a proportion of the federal financial participation due to the
state will be withheld.
12 "As originally proposed, the regulations would have excluded from Federal financial
participation ... all expenditures for payments for ineligible cases and overpayments for
eligible cases .... " 38 Fed. Reg. 8743 (1973) (emphasis added).
In addition to expressing a concern about financial penalties, responses to the proposed
regulations governing fraud cases questioned whether the regulations conformed to con-
stitutional due process requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970). The rule initially proposed would have dispensed with the requirement
that timely notice be given before suspension or termination of probable fraud cases.
Because of Goldberg's requirement that a recipient be granted a pretermination notice and
evidentiary hearing, federally-aided programs generally provide for a 10-day notice to a
recipient. HEW noted the special need to .move quickly in cases of probable fraud and
modified the new regulation to provide for a 5-day notice. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (4) (iv)
(1974).
" In addition to changing the notice requirement in cases of probable fraud (see note
12 supra), HEW modified the quality control section to extend the base period for determin-
ing error rates by six months. 39 Fed. Reg. 37,195 (1974).
14 In the first six months of 1974, the AFDC benefits of 17,500 ineligible families were
terminated. A federal subsample to check on quality control found 9.7% ineligible recip-
ients, 21.7% overpayments, and 8.1% underpayments. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1974, at 34,
col. 1. Although the total number of families receiving AFDC benefits was at its highest in
858
In addition to these administrative controls, new HEW regula-
tions clarified the scope of permissible state discretion to establish
coverage and conditions of eligibility for financial assistance. 15
Although these regulations did not go as far as some states would
have liked, within the confines of constitutional limitations, stan-
dards have been broadened.16 States are permitted to impose
narrower limits on public assistance coverage than those provided
in the Social Security Act only where the Act or its legislative
history authorizes such limitations.17 However, states may now
impose upon applicants conditions that result in the termination or
denial of benefits "if such conditions assist the States in the efficient
administration of its public assistance programs, or further an
independent State welfare policy, and are not inconsistent with the
provisions and purposes of the Social Security Act."1 8 Thus, al-
though it appears that states may not limit the class of eligible
recipients beyond the federal mandate, they may terminate or
deny aid to individual recipients with greater latitude than in the
past.19
II
AFDC ELIGIBILITY BASED ON NEED
Eligibility for the AFDC program is based on need, a standard
which is derived from the level of a household's officially calculated
income and resources.2 0 In the past, the Social Security Act has
been interpreted to require that states determine eligibility by
considering the actual level of income and resources available to a
potential recipient.2 1 However, to improve administrative effi-
September 1974 (3,222,000), the total number of recipients (children and parent(s) or
caretaker relative(s)) was down from a peak reached in 1972. In December 1972 11,065,000
persons received AFDC benefits. By September 1974 this number was reduced to
10,796,000. 38 Soc. SEC. BULL., March 1975, at 42, Table M-31.
15 45 C.F.R. § 233.10 (1974).
16 These new regulations appear to comply with standards for state discretion articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405 (1973). See notes 76-79 and accompanying text infra.
17 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1)(ii)(A) (1974).
18 Id. § 233.10(a)(1)(ii)(B).
19 The new regulation appears to be aimed at endorsing state procedures for ensuring
against welfare fraud, such as the photo, identification procedure used in New York City,
and the criminal and civil sanctions provided in Connecticut's requirement of information
disclosure about absent parents. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-440(b) (Supp. 1975). See note 95
infra.
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970), especially § 602(a)(7); 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20, 233.90 (1974).
21 See, e.g., Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
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ciency, 22 or in an effort to regulate the behavior of recipients,23
many states have adopted procedures that embody presumptions
of availability, without regard to whether the funds are actually
available to potential recipients. 24 In 1974, various presumptions
were invalidated in decisions requiring the states to comply with
the general requirement of actual determination of availability.
A. Lodgers
In 1973 there were two federal court challenges25 to the New
York State regulations 26 that provided for a pro rata reduction in
the AFDC rental stipend if there was a lodger present in an
AFDC household. 27 In both instances, the regulations were de-
clared invalid as contrary to the Social Security Act and violative of
the supremacy clause.28 By requiring a pro rata reduction in the
rental stipend, the regulations conclusively presume that a lodger is
contributing to a family's income, whether or not he actually makes
such a contribution. The Supreme Court has found this type of
presumption impermissible.29
The Supreme Court in Van Lare v. Hurley30 held that the
22 Vialpando v. Shea, 475 F.2d 731, 735 (10th Cir. 1973), affd, 416 U.S. 251 (1974).
21 See Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859, 865 & n.41 (1974).
24 For an extensive listing of cases in different areas of the law in which such
presumptions have been invalidated, see 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 150, 154 & n.29 (1974). See
also Note, 1974 Developments in Welfare Law-The Supplemental Security Income Program, 60
CORNELL L. REv. 825, 851-52 (1975), for an analysis of the principle of income attribution as
applied to SSI recipients.
25 Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) and Taylor v. Lavine,
[1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 18,046 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). The cases were
consolidated and reversed on appeal, Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub
nom. Van Lare v. Hurley, 43 U.S.L.W. 4592 (U.S. May 19, 1975).
26 18 NYCRR 352.30(d) (Dec. 31, 1974) (recipient's shelter allowance reduced if the
recipient houses a noncontributing "lodger"); 18 NYCRR 352.31(a)(3)(iv) (Oct. 31, 1974)
(male living with a female recipient, but not married to her, treated as a "lodger"). A lodger
is defined in the regulations as a person not legally responsible for the support of the aided
recipient. 18 NYCRR 352.30(d) (Dec. 31, 1974). The pro rata reduction in shelter allowance
is enforced if the lodger does not contribute at least $15 per month to the household. Id.
27 In the federal court actions, the state regulations in question were found to be
inconsistent with HEW regulations (45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1974)). See, e.g., 365 F. Supp. at
195. In a separate state court action, the state regulations were also found to violate the
HEW regulations. Battle v. Lavine, 44 App. Div. 2d 307, 354 N.Y.S.2d 680 (2d Dep't 1974).
28 The court in Hurley based its decision on the cases of King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968), and Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970). Lewis held that AFDC was available to
children deprived of support of a "parent." Parents are defined for purposes of the Social
Security Act as only those persons with a legal duty of support. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
King held that a state could only consider such income as was actually available for current
use.
29 365 F. Supp. at 194-95, citing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) and Lewis v.
Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
30 43 U.S.L.W. 4592 (U.S. May 19, 1975).
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district courts' invalidation of the regulations was correct. The
regulations conflict with the Social Security Act insofar as they
assume that the nonpaying lodger is contributing to the welfare
household, without inquiry into whether he in fact does so."
The regulations had also been attacked on constitutional
grounds. A district court had found they created an irrebuttable
presumption in violation of the due process clause. 32 The lower
31 On appeal, the two district court cases (see note 25 supra) had been reversed by the
Second Circuit. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974). The court of appeals
rejected the district courts' finding of a statutory conflict and said that New York's
regulations were not inconsistent with the Social Security Act:
The New York regulation merely determines the level of payment to the eligible
family on the basis of the presence or absence of a lodger in the recipient
household. This method of computing shelter allowance is permitted under the
King v. Smith rationale if it is not designed to vindicate-a moral interest unrelated to
the need of the family, and if it realistically determines the level of need.
Id. at 1214-15. The court did not think that the regulations created a prohibited conclusive
presumption:
The regulations imply only that the lodger's presence evidences the recipient
family's diminished need for housing space ....
[T]he New York regulations are based on the fair inference from the presence
of the lodger.., that the AFDC-recipient family actually needs less space... than it
is paying rent for.
Id. at 1215. Thus, the pro rata reduction was said to reflect the recipient's actual need.
Judge Oakes, vigorously dissenting, argued that the majority's labeling of the presump-
tion as a "fair inference" did not change its conclusive nature because the regulations
precluded rebuttal. In addition, he found a "moral interest" to be underlying the regulations
since the state "seeks to punish the welfare family for using its own resources in a manner of
which the Commissioner disapproves" whenever the AFDC household extends shelter to a
lodger. Id. at 1221. The Supreme Court in Van Lare rejected the reasoning of the court of
appeals and reversed, invalidating the regulations on the same basis as did the district courts.
12 The Second Circuit had remanded the district court cases to a three-judge court for
consideration of the remaining constitutional issues. In Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp.
167 (S. & E.D.N.Y. 1974), the New York regulations were once again invalidated, this time
for violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The court discussed the due process
violation in the following terms:
Before reducing the shelter allowance of a recipient family because the family
houses a noncontributing lodger, the state must make an individualized determina-
tion of whether the presence of the lodger does in fact diminish the family's shelter
needs. If presumptions are used they must be rebuttable.
Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F.Supp. 167, 175 (S. & E.D.N.Y. 1974) (emphasis in original). The
court summarily dismissed other constitutional questions raised by the plaintiff. It found no
sex discrimination (i.e., although the statute made reference to a "male" lodger at one point,
it was found generally to apply to "persons"), no invasion of privacy, and no deprivation of
the right to free association. Although the court recognized a valid equal protection
argument, it held that the classification (welfare recipients who house noncontributing
lodgers versus those who do not) was appropriately related to the valid state interest of
seeking to allocate scarce resources where they were most needed. The court treated this
latter claim as overlapping with the due process claim. Id. at 176-77.
Judge Hays, who had written the Second Circuit's opinion in Taylor v. Lavine, dissented
from the three-judge court decision. He asserted that the Second Circuit's reasoning in
Taylor controlled this case and that the pro rata reduction was a valid presumption because a
lodger, by necessity, must have some means of contributing to an AFDC household, even if
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court found the regulations were based upon two presumptions,
neither of which was universally or necessarily true.33 The Su-
preme Court did not reach the constitutional question in Van Lare.34
But in light of this decision, the states are again cautioned that
needy children may not be deprived of welfare assistance to
further some other state policy.3 5
B. Stepfathers
Attempts by the states to make the determination of need for
an AFDC family turn upon a presumed contribution to the house-
hold by a stepfather 6 are analogous to the attribution of income or
resources assumed from the presence of a lodger.3 7 The cases that
considered this issue in 1974 resolved the controversy by relying on
principles set forth in Lewis v. Martin,3 8 a Supreme Court case that
had presumably settled this area of the law. Lewis held that the
validity of the presumption of a contribution to an AFDC house-
hold depended upon the existence of a state law of general
applicability compelling stepfathers to support their dependent
children.3 9 Therefore, in the absence of a stepfather's legal duty to
support his children, a state could not reasonably presume that his
his only potential resources were his own eligibility for public assistance. Id. at 178. This
reasoning, however, ignores the requirement of the Social Security Act and of HEW
regulations that only actually available income and resources be taken into account. 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.90(a) (1974).
33 The rejected presumptions were that a recipient family able to house a noncontribut-
ing lodger (1) needs less space for its own use, and/or (2) requires less money to pay its own
pro rata share of the rent. Judge Weinstein discussed at length possible factual cir-
cumstances, such as the low vacancy rate for low-rental housing, which migbt present an
alternative interpretation of why a lodger was present and of why an AFDC family migbt not
need less space. Id. at 173-74.
14 Van Lare v. Hurley, 43 U.S.L.W. 4592 (U.S. May 19, 1975). Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting, did reach the constitutional issues presented. Id. at 4595. He found the regula-
tions were not constitutionally defective for the reasons cited by Judge Hays dissenting in
Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167, 177 (S. & E.D.N.Y. 1974). See note 32 supra.
35 "But States may not seek to accomplish policies aimed at lodgers by depriving needy
children of benefits." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4595. Consistent interpretation in several earlier cases
had led to the invalidation of regulations containing similar irrebuttable presumptions. See,
e.g., Roselli v. Affleck, 373 F. Supp. 36 (D.R.1. 1974), where a "flat grant" system of
providing shelter allowances was rejected as violating the Social Security Act.
36 See generally Developments in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 859, 864-65
(1974).
37 See notes 25-35 and accompanying text supra.
38 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
'9 Lewis uphelcl the HEW regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1969), now codified in
essentially the same form in 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1974), requiring a state law of general
applicability. The threshold issue to be resolved in these cases is the definition of "general
applicability." Even in the face of a state-required stepfather support obligation, the courts
must determine whether it meets this standard.
income was available and could not terminate or decrease AFDC
benefits without evidence of a stepfather's actual contribution to
the household. 40
Litigation in 1974 focused upon whether relevant state laws
imposed generally applicable stepfather support obligations and
thus whether a presumption of stepfather support contributions
was reasonable. Under this analysis, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
and New York regulations requiring that a stepfather's income be
considered available to an AFDC family were held contrary to
HEW regulations implementing the Social Security Act because of
the absence of a generally applicable duty of support.41
C. Standardized Formulas: Work Expenses and Presumed Payments
States have attempted to impose presumptions of available
resources and level of need in two other areas: deductible work
expenses and average family need levels. In 1974 several courts
rejected these efforts as impermissibly ignoring the actual financial
situation of an AFDC family.
In determining eligibility for AFDC based on the level of need,
the Social Security Act requires that states "take into consideration"
expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of income.42 A
principal purpose of the AFDC program is to help parents and
relatives "attain or retain- capability for the maximum self-support
and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of
continuing parental care and protection. 43 To help achieve this
purpose, expenses attributable to the earning of income are disre-
40 397 U.S. at 559-60. See also 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1974).
41 The New York regulations, 18 NYCRR 352.31(a)(2) (Dec. 31, 1974), were found
not to reflect a generally applicable duty of support by a stepfather in New York,
and thus the irrebuttable presumption that he was in fact contributing was unreason-
able. Uhrovick v. Lavine, 43 App. Div. 2d 481, 352 N.Y.S.2d 529 (3d Dep't), aff'd mem., 35
N.Y.2d 892, 324 N.E.2d 360, 364 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1974). A case that challenged the same New
York regulations in federal court resulted in a district court injunction against their
enforcement on the grounds of contravention of the federal regulations (45 C.F.R.
§ 233.90(a) (1974)). Freda v. Lavine, 494 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit va-
cated this decision on the grounds of federal abstention, citing the then unresolved Uhrovick
case as indicating that New York courts were in the process of clarifying a confused statutory
scheme. Id. at 109.
In Meagher v. Hennepin County Welfare Bd., 221 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. 1974), the
Minnesota Supreme Court declared null and void the state policy of automatically reducing
a family's AFDC benefits by making the mother ineligible upon her remarriage without
considering her needs and those of her children. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WELFARE, INCOME-MAINTENANCE MANUAL, IV-2224.04, quoted, 221 N.W.2d at 141-42. For
litigation in New Hampshire, see Messier v. Zeiller, 373 F. Supp. 1198 (D.N.H. 1974).
42 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. l11, 1973).
43 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
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garded when determining need.4 4 The disregard of these expenses
serves to encourage employment, while recognizing that any in-
come produced does not eliminate entirely the need for public
assistance. 4
5
Some states have simplified the calculation of work expenses
by establishing a standard amount to be disregarded for an
employed AFDC applicant. 4 6 In Shea v. Vialpando,47 however, the
Supreme Court held that such formulas may be invalid if they
create a standard work expense disregard that effectively serves as
a conclusive presumption of the amount to be deducted.48 Under
the guidelines articulated in Shea, a standard allowance is permissi-
ble only if it also provides for individual consideration of expenses
in excess of the standard. 49 The Court held that the language of
the Social Security Act ("take into consideration")"° is not satisfied
by the use of a statistical average; actual expenses must be taken into
account. 5
1
14 "[O]nly such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis will
be considered, and only currently available resources will be considered. ... 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1974).
45 The legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. III, 1973) supports this
interpretation.
Under existing law if these work expenses are not considered in determining need,
they have the effect of providing a disincentive to working since that portion of the
family budget spent for work expenses has the effect of reducing the amount
available for food, clothing, and shelter.
S. REP. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1962). This legislative history is cited as
persuasive in Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974).
46 In Colorado, a standardized figure of $30 per month for work expense allowances
was reached by taking a statistical average of work expenses incurred by every recipient in
the AFDC program during a one year period. 416 U.S. at 255 n.2. See also Developments in
Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859, 862 (1974).
47 416 U.S. 251 (1974).
48 The Court held that Congress, in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. III, 1973),
had directed that no limitation except reasonableness be placed upon the recognition of
expenses attributable to the earning of income. It was therefore contrary to the Social
Security Act to impose a fixed work expense allowance that did not permit deductions for
expenses in excess of the standard. 416 U.S. at 260.
49 416 U.S. at 265.
50 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. III, 1973).
51 [l]t seems inescapable that whatever treatment is accorded income must also be
extended to expenses attributable to the earning of income. And, it has consistently
been the practice to compute the income of an AFDC applicant on an individual
basis.
Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 260 (1974) (emphasis added). Colorado's use of a
standardized employment expense disregard was declared invalid as being in conflict with
the Social Security Act. Although the Court decided this case on the grounds of statutory
conflict, the decision was rooted in the due process argnment against conclusive presump-
tions. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra. In two other cases related to deduction
of work expenses, regulations were invalidated because of their conflict with the Social
Security Act. In Rivet v. Minter, 2 CCH Pov. L. REp. 20,038 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 1974), a
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Courts in 1974 rejected several other state procedures that
were based on presumptions of available income and which ig-
nored actual availability.52 In a key decision, the Fifth Circuit
declared invalid a Georgia welfare department policy which aver-
aged the income available to children who were the intended
beneficiaries of court-ordered child support.53 Because these child
support payments were often sporadic and unpredictable, the
policy was found to be in conflict with federal regulations54 that
require determination of AFDC eligibility to be based on actually
available child support payments rather than potential payments.
This decision, and others, dearly suggest that the courts will
continue to implement the Social Security Act by consistently
requiring that states take into account a recipient's actual need
when determining his eligibility. 55
III
NONNEED FACTORS OF ELIGIBILITY-AID TO THE UNBORN
The question of whether unborn children are eligible for
AFDC benefits was extensively litigated in 1974.56 Of the six circuits
section of the Massachusetts Public Assistance Manual was held invalid for denying AFDC
recipients enrolled in a program under an amendment to the Manpower Development &
Training Act of 1962, Act of Nov. 7, 1966, Pub. L. 89-792, § 4(c), 80 Stat. 1435 (repealed
1973), a full disregard for a training incentive and expense allowance. In Dunbar v.
Weinberger, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 20,039 (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 1974), Massachusetts regula-
tions denying a full disregard of income earned as a work incentive for participating in a
Work Incentive Program (WIN) were also invalidated. The court stated that a recipient could
not be refused AFDC benefits simply because of participation in a federal work incentive
program. See also Conover v. Hall, I I Cal. 3d 842,523 P.2d 682, 114 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1974) ($50
standard deduction for work expenses held invalid).
52 Two cases rejected the use of "flat grants" where particular needs, varying materially
from the average, were disregarded. Clark v. New Hampshire Dep't of Health & Welfare,
[1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 18,667 (N.H. Feb. 20, 1974); Roselli v.
Affleck, 373 F. Supp. 36 (D.R.I. 1974). See note 35 supra.
51 Barron v. Bellairs, 496 F.2d 1187 (5th Cir. 1974).
54 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1974).
5 See note 52 supra.
56 This question was answered in the affirmative in five of the six circuits where it was
raised. See note 57 infra. In agreement with the majority of the circuits were Morris v.
Houston, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 19,945 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 1974); Reilley v. Wohlgemuth,
2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 19,681 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 1974); Wheling v. Westby, 2 CCH Pov. L.
REP. 19,252 (D.S.D. Jan. 14, 1974); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1973);
Boines v. Lavine, 44 App. Div. 2d 765, 354 N.Y.S.2d 252 (4th Dep't), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1040 (1974); Chillous v. Lavine, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 18,556
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Feb. 6, 1974); Murphy v. Lavine, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L.
REP. 18,555 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Jan. 30, 1974).
In accord with the minority circuit holding that an unborn child was not a child for
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which addressed this question, five held that AFDC benefits should
be extended to the unborn.57 Such a finding requires that the
unborn must be included when benefit levels and eligibility for an
AFDC household are determined. These decisions raised questions
of constitutional interpretation as well as of possible conflict be-
tween state regulations and the Social Security Act. The Supreme
Court considered these issues in Burns v. Alcala.58
A. Statutory Argument
The Burns decision, in construing the Social Security Act 59 and
HEW regulations, 60  rejected the contention that the unborn
child was mandatorily eligible for AFDC benefits under federal
law. In reversing the Eighth Circuit's decision granting aid, the
Supreme Court examined the major arguments which had been
made in the various circuits for inclusion of the unborn.
Before the Burns case, HEW regulations interpreting the Act
allowed a state an option to provide AFDC benefits to unborn
children if they would be eligible for such benefits once they were
born.6' In accord with the longstanding rule of judicial interpreta-
tion, that the opinion of the agency charged with administering a
statute should be given considerable weight, 62 courts had generally
purposes of AFDC and thus not eligible for aid were Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51 (M.D.
Fla. 1974) and Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974).
57 Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 1180 (1975), extended
aid to unborn children as did Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974), Wilson v.
Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), and Doe v. Lukhard, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974),
which have been subsequently vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for further
consideration in light of Burns. 95 S. Ct. 1440-41 (1975). The fifth case in this majority is
Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S.
Jan. 17, 1975) (No. 74-877). Only the Second Circuit held to the contrary. Wisdom v.
Norton, 507 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1974).
58 95 S. Ct. 1180 (1975).
59 The Social Security Act defines dependent child as
a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of
the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a
parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother,
brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first
cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such
relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or
(B) under the age of twenty-one and. .. a student regularly attending a school ....
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
60 HEW regulations provide for federal subsidy of payment to an unborn child.
Federal financial participation is available in:
(ii) Payments with respect to an unborn child when the fact of preguancy has
been determined by medical diagnosis;
45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii) (1974).
I Id.
62 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
placed the unborn in the category of "dependent children" when
states chose to include them.63
However, lower courts rejected the optional nature of the
inclusion. 64 They "seriously question[ed] the right of HEW, as
opposed to the unquestioned right of Congress, to decide what
benefits are optional. ' 65 These courts held that states had no
option to deny such benefits if the unborn were considered eligible
for benefits under federal AFDC standards. 66 However, because
the Supreme Court decided in Burns that federal standards do not
require provision of aid to the unborn, the states may again have the
63 See, e.g., Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974). "Since 1941 HEW and its
predecessors have consistently interpreted the Act so as to provide benefits to unborn
children who in all other aspects save birth qualify ..... Id. at 157. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument in Burns v. Alcala, 95 S. Ct. 1180, 1186 (1975). The Court referred
to a brief submitted on behalf of HEW in the Burns case which disavowed this interpretation
of its past allowance of aid to the unborn. HEW took the position that its consistent past
history of aid to unborn children was not based upon their indusion in the federal eligibility
standards as dependent children. Rather, this aid was permitted by the agency's general
rule-making power, 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), and was intended, along with other provisions
of that subsection, to provide temporary aid at the option of states to individuals in the
process of gaining or losing aid under the AFDC program. 95 S. Ct. at 1186.
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Burns, vigorously contested HEW's explanation of their
past practices. Calling the new HEW position an "inventive solution," and a "late-blooming
tactical switch," Marshall asserted that HEW changed its interpretation only after lawsuits
had been initiated to compel payments to the unborn in states which had not granted such
benefits in their AFDC plans. "I would view somewhat skeptically the agency's assertion that
it has never deemed unborn children to be within the eligibility provisions of § 406(a)." 95 S.
Ct. at 1189. Thus, Justice Marshall would find support for inclusion of the unborn in the
past and consistent interpretation of the agency charged with administering the statute.
64 Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 752 (2d Cir. 1974); Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d
1244, 1248 (Ist Cir. 1974); Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743, 746 (8th Cir. 1974); Doe v.
Lukhard, 493 F.2d 54, 60 (4th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court in Burns refused to deal with
the propriety of the optional nature of this inclusion since no challenge to this position was
briefed or argued before the Court. 95 S. Ct. at 1187.
65 Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743, 746 (8th Cir. 1974).
8 As elaborated in several Supreme Court decisions, the test for determining eligibility
for AFDC benefits is:
[I]n the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion learly evidenced
from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that
excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the
Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971). Certain lower courts had interpreted this
language as creating a presumption of inclusion where the Act was ambiguous. In Burns,
however, the Court explicitly indicated such a view was contrary to ordinary principles of
statutory interpretation. The Court held that Townsend
establish[ed] only that once the federal standard of eligibility is defined, a participating
State may not deny aid to persons who come within it in the absence of a dear
indication that Congress meant the coverage to be optional. The method of analysis
used to define the federal standard of eligibility is no different from that used in
solving any other prohlem of statutory construction.
95 S. Ct. at 1184.
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option to make such benefits available under their power to grant
temporary assistance.67
The circuits that required the mandatory granting of aid
found support in the legislative history of the Social Security Act
for HEW's decision to include the unborn. They noted that Con-
gress had tacitly approved the HEW regulation allowing aid,68
and pointed to the failure of congressional efforts in 1972 to
specifically exclude the unborn from AFDC.6 9 Burns rejected this
argument, and found that both House and Senate proposals would
have excluded unborn children from aid and that the failure of
such a "minor provision" to be enacted was attributable only to an
inability of the two houses to agree on major issues of AFDC
reform.70
Lower courts had pointed to the purpose of AFDC as well as
the legislative history of the Act when they endorsed the extension
of benefits to unborn children. The courts cited the protection of
needy children as the paramount goal of the AFDC program. 71
"Payments to the unborn are an appropriate, if not essential,
means to that end, especially in light of the undisputed evidence
. . . that pre-natal nutrition and medical care are important
determinants of 'later susceptibility to disease, neurological prob-
lems and long-term learning capacity.' "72
67 Id. at 1187.
68 See, e.g., Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1974); Carver v. Hooker, 501
F.2d 1244, 1247 (1st Cir. 1974). However, some jurists did not find this interpretation of
congressional silence persuasive:
That Congress in several decades has not dealt specifically in the present context
with the status of the unborn child is as consistent with the belief that the fetus was
not eligible as otherwise ....
Whie both houses passed bills to [exclude the unborn], because of other
differences on proposed revisions of Title 1V neither version became law. There
was significantly, however, no disagreement on the aspect of the legislation here
involved.
Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1974) (Pell, J., dissenting in part).
69 Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1974).
70 95 S. Ct. at 1187.
Under the circumstances, failure to enact the relatively minor provision relating to
unborn children cannot be regarded as approval of HEW's practice of allowing
optional benefits. To the extent this legislative history sheds any light on congres-
sional intent, it tends to rebut the claim that Congress by silence has acquiesced in
the former HEW view that unborn children are eligible for AFDC payments.
Id.
7' King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968); Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 158 (7th
Cir. 1974).
72 Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244, 1247 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Wilson v. Weaver, 499
F.2d 155, 158 n.3 (7th Cir. 1974) (medical opinion as to the importance of prenatal care for
the future health of the unborn child).
Burns, however, recognized a different purpose of the AFDC
program.7 3 The Supreme Court accepted the interpretation of the
one circuit which did not support the extension of coverage to the
unborn. The Second Circuit had held that the purpose of Title IV
(AFDC) was to allow mothers of fatherless children to stay home
and care for their dependents and that providing AFDC benefits to
the unborn did nothing to further this purpose.7 4 In fact, at the
time of the passage of the Social Security Act, a separate title
provided for prenatal and maternal care.7 5
The Burns decision also incorporated an additional argument
against inclusion of the unborn based on a revised interpretation of
appropriate standards for measuring state discretion, which was
implicitly suggested by the Supreme Court's decision in New York
Department of Social Services v. Dublino .76 Although the case did not
involve the rights of the unborn, Dublino is relevant because the
Court distinguished a state's right to exclude from AFDC eligibility
persons who were expressly included in the Social Security Act (a
policy which is clearly prohibited by recent Supreme Court deci-
sions) from a state's right to exclude those not expressly included. 77
The Court concluded that where there is no express inclusion a
state may exercise its discretion not to provide benefits.7 8 Burns
73 95 S. Ct. at 1184-85.
74 Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1974).
7' Social Security Act, Title V, 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-16 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 701-16 (Supp. III, 1973) (Maternal and Child Health and Crippled Children's Services).
Judge Coffin, however, rejected the argument that the existence of Title V precluded the
inclusion of the unborn under Title IV:
But Titles IV and V are qualitatively different weapons against poverty and
deprivation, the latter providing medical services while the former disburses cash
for improvement of the home environment. Moreover, because the medical services
provided under Title V extend to born as well as unborn cbildren, it seems
incongruous that Congress would not make similar provision under Title IV. Thus,
the congressional concern evidenced by Title V with respect to pre-natal care does
not militate against an intention to assist the unborn through AFDC payments as
well.
Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244, 1246 (1st Cir. 1974). See also Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d
155, 159 (7th Cir. 1974) (Pell, J., dissenting in part). The Supreme Court in Burns did not
find the existence of Tide V persuasive evidence that aid should be granted to the unborn.
Rather, the Court endorsed the view of Judge Weinfeld in Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1974), that "Title V is as evidence.., of a congressional intent not to include unborn
children under AFDC but to provide for maternity care in a different section of the statute."
Id. at 755 n.27 (emphasis in original). See Burns v. Alcala, 95 S. Ct. 1180, 1186 n.10 (1975).
76 413 U.S. 405 (1973). See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
7 See note 66 supra.
78 413 U.S. at 417. A Dublino rationale has been used to condemn inclusion of the
unborn. Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 158-60 (7th Cir. 1974) (Pell, J., dissenting in part).
Judge Pell would rely on the plain meaning of the word "child" to show no congressional
intent to provide benefits to the unborn. He reasons that a father has no duty to support an
1975] AFDC
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
endorsed this reasoning and added that to deny a state the right to
exclude those not specifically covered in the statute would be to
create a presumption of coverage where the statute was ambigu-
ous, contrary to general notions of statutory interpretation.7 9 Al-
though Burns was decided contrary to the apparent trend of the
circuit courts, it did conclusively resolve the statutory issue and
established that the unborn were not mandatorily eligible for
benefits under federal law.
B. Constitutional Argument
Although the Supreme Court settled the statutory issue pre-
sented by the provision of aid to the unborn, it remanded Burns to
the district court for consideration of the remaining constitutional
questions.80 Lower courts have dealt summarily with the equal
protection questions raised by the denial of aid to unborn chil-
dren.81 The threshold equal protection issue is whether a fetus is a
person for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court's abortion decisions may be interpreted as proscribing the
recognition of a fetus, at least in the first trimester of pregnancy, as
a "human being" for purposes of constitutional protection, 82 but
there has not been a definitive statement of law on this point.
A question also remains whether a distinction may rationally
be drawn between unborn children and all other children when a
state decides whether or not to provide benefits to the unborn.83
unborn child; nor can a child be deprived of parental support, as required by the statute,
until there are parents, and "[n]either mother nor father is 'a parent' before a child is born."
79 95 S. Ct. at 1184-85. It is possible to distinguish the provision of benefits to the
unborn from the Work Rules requirement upheld in Dublino. In Dublino, New York was
allowed to exclude from benefits those who would not accept employment if they were able
to work. 413 U.S. at 418-22. The Court found no congressional intent to expressly include
applicants who fell within the Work Rules provisions. Id. at 418-19. It may be argued,
however, that the long history of granting aid to the unborn, in accord with HEW
regulations, is tantamount to an express inclusion of the unborn within the statutory scheme.
See also note 66 supra.
80 Burns v. Alcala, 95 S. Ct. 1180, 1187 (1975).
81 "1 am unaware of any court decision which has given serious consideration to a
resolution of the present issue on an equal protection basis and I therefore find no necessity
for addressing that contention." Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155, 161 (7th Cir. 1974) (Pell,
J., dissenting in part).
82 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158-64 (1973). "Roe suggests that the status of a foetus as
a person for purposes of the equal protection clause may be sufficiently different from a
child who is born so that the 'rational basis' test ... may permit differential treatment." Doe
v. Lukhard, 493 F.2d 54, 57 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974).
83 Even if a fetus is not a "human being" for constitutional purposes following the
abortion case, "that decision neither proscribes the recognition of a fetus as 'living' nor
forbids the government to benefit the fetus." Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244, 1246 n.2 (Ist
Cir. 1974).
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Should a state decide not to provide such benefits, the courts must
determine whether it is discriminatory to separate the unborn class
from a class consisting of all children.8 4 The classification must be
rationally related to advancing the purposes of the Social Security
Act and the AFDC program if it is not to constitute an invidious
discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 85
These constitutional issues await resolution on the remand of
Burns. In light of the Court's reluctance to extend constitutional
protection to the unborn, evidenced by the abortion decisions, it is
unlikely that the Court will favor an extension of equal protection
rights to them.
IV
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ELIGIBILITY-ENFORCEMENT OF
AN ABSENT PARENT'S SUPPORT OBLIGATION
Both legislative and judicial activity in 1974 involved the right
of a state to condition AFDC eligibility upon whether a recipient
assisted the state in locating an absent parent who had a legal duty
to support dependent and needy children. Recent amendments to
the Social Security Act have significantly increased a state's power
to compel the disclosure of information relating to the location of
additional sources of support for potential AFDC recipients. 86 This
84 None of the circuits that granted aid to the unborn reached the equal protection
issue. However the Second Circuit, which denied such benefits, found that the classification
of unborn children and their mothers was a rational means of advancing one of the
purposes of the Social Security Act, which the court interpreted as keeping relatives in the
home to supervise the upbringing of children. Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 757-59 (2d
Cir. 1974).
85 The standards for meeting equal protection requirements are articulated in San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). If a classification does
not operate to the disadvantage of some suspect class or infringe a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution, it does not require strict judicial scrutiny. It must still be
examined, however, to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated
state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 17.
86 The Social Services Amendments of 1974 (Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647,
88 Stat. 2337) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) provide that states must require, as
a condition of eligibility, that applicants cooperate in the location of a person with a legal
duty to support a dependent child and assign to the state any rights to such support. The
amendments also impose severe financial penalties if a state fails to provide an effective plan
to obtain such support. The state may lose up to five percent of its federal subsidy for child
support programs for failure to implement an effective program for establishing paternity
and obtaining support payments for children who seek AFDC aid. 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 602(a)(26)-(27), 603(h) (Pamph. Feb. 1975).
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change in the federal statute eclipses the importance of earlier
successful claims by litigants that states could not condition eligibil-
ity beyond need and dependency criteria where Congress had not
done so. In previous years, states had attempted to condition the
eligibility of an AFDC household upon the initiation of support
proceedings or other disclosures concerning a missing parent.
These attempts were struck down because they created an addi-
tional condition of eligibility, beyond need and dependency, con-
trary to the intent of the Social Security Act.87
Because of this conflict over the validity of disclosure require-
ments, Congress took action to clarify the situation. The Social
Services Amendments of 197488 added specific language amending
the AFDC Title to provide that the requirement of cooperation, in
disclosure was a federally mandated condition of eligibility for
aid,89 and that state plans for AFDC programs must include
provisions to assist in obtaining any possible support from legally
obligated absent parents. 90 Federal money was made available to
assist in the search for additional sources of support from absent
parents. 9' The amendments also provided for the creation of a
"Parent Locator Service" to assist a state, court, or resident in
finding absent parents.92 The passage of this legislation moots a
question which had been in the midst of litigation during 1974.
Early attempts by the states to compel disclosure of informa-
Even prior to the 1974 amendments, the Social Security Act included several provisions
relating to the location of absent parents and state efforts to ohtain financial support from
them. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1 1) (Supp. III, 1973) requires states to notify local law enforcement
officials of the desertion or abandonment of a child, if such desertion or abandonment
would make that child a "dependent" for AFDC eligibility purposes. This is the so-called
NOLEO (Notice of Law Enforcement Officials) provision. The states are also required to design
a program
in the case of a child born out of wedlock who is receiving aid to families with
dependent children, to establish the paternity of such child and secure support for
him, and [also] ... in the case of any child receiving such aid who has been deserted
or abandoned by his parent, to secure support ....
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (Supp. III, 1973) (emphasis added). Section 602(a)(18) requires states
to provide for cooperative arrangements among the courts, law enforcement officials, and
state agencies administering AFDC to implement § 602(a)(17).
87 See, e.g., Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. 111.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Weaver v. Doe,
404 U.S. 987 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N:D. Cal.), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Carleson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 (1971); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ore.), aff'd
mem., 404 U.S. 803 (1971).
88 Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
89 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 602(a)(26)-(27) (Pamph. Feb. 1975).
90 Id.
91 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 (Pamph. Feb. 1975).
92 42 U.S.C.A. § 653(a) (Pamph. Feb. 1975).
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tion and other types of cooperation by AFDC recipients resulted in
court decisions which held that a child's eligibility for AFDC
benefits could not be conditioned upon parental conduct.93 In
response, the states modified their former approach of precluding
an entire household from AFDC coverage for its failure to cooper-
ate. The current policy simply provides for the reduction or
elimination of the proportionate share of benefits that would have
been allocated to the uncooperative parent or caretaker. 94 Civil and
criminal sanctions are also imposed upon recalcitrants. 95
Under this modified approach, the states maintained that the
disclosure requirements were no longer impermissible conditions
of eligibility, but rather were a "method of obtaining information
so that actual need and therefore eligibility could be deter-
mined. ' 96 They further argued that the notice provisions in the
Social Security Act97 were intended to facilitate and encourage the
obtaining of support from legally obligated absent parents,98 and
that Congress must have intended to give the states authority to
enforce these provisions. This argument, based on legislative in-
tent, was reinforced by the broad discretion traditionally allowed
the states in implementing AFDC programs as long as no specific
provisions of the Constitution or the Social Security Act were
violated. 99 In the exercise of this discretion, the states contended
that the modified disclosure requirements were necessary to facili-
tate the development of alternative programs of support for needy
children and to minimize reasonably the unnecessary expenditure
of public moneys. 100
93 See, e.g., Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Carleson v.
Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 (1971).
94 See, e.g., 18 NYCRR 369.2(f)(3)(i)(e)(4) (1975).
" See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-440(b) (Supp. 1975) which makes failure to
disclose information about the biological father of illegitimate children and failure to
prosecute a paternity action subject to fine and/or imprisonment for contempt.
01 This is the State of Utah's characterization of the relevant section of tbe Utah State
Department of Social Services Policy Manual as quoted in Doe v. Rampton, 497 F.2d 1032, 1035
(10th Cir. 1974).
97 See note 86 supra.
98 Shirley v. Lavine, 365 F. Supp. 818, 821 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
Lascaris v. Shirley, 95 S. Ct. 1190 (1975).
99 But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented
by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court. ... [T]he
Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged
with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the
myriad of potential recipients.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
100 Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65, 73 n.10 (D. Conn. 1973), prob. juris. noted sub nom.
Roe v. Norton, 415 U.S. 912 (1974) (No. 73-6033). Connecticut indicated that its statute was
1975] AFDC
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:857
The arguments against the imposition of disclosure require-
ments, even with modified sanctions, raised questions of statutory
interpretation as well as the claim of violations of constitutional
guarantees. On statutory grounds, it was asserted that, before the
1974 amendments to the Social Security Act, state laws and regula-
tions requiring recipient cooperation in paternity or support ac-
tions were in violation of the Social Security Act and therefore void
under the supremacy clause. 10 1 Potential recipients could be
excluded in a manner allowed by the Social Security Act only if
there were evidence of congressional intent which justified the
exclusion, 0 2 such as legislative history. Because federal disclosure
of information requirements had consistently been construed by
the judiciary as not imposing an additional condition of eligibili-
ty,10 3 and because Congress did not take any corrective action to
alter this policy before 1974,104 the requisite legislative intent was
arguably missing. Until recently, HEW, the administrative agency
charged with approving state plans, gave the federal disclosure
requirements a similar interpretation. However in 1973, under
pressure from New York State, HEW altered its interpretation. 10 5
Accordingly, new regulations permitted states to disallow mainte-
nance payments for a parent or caretaker relative who failed to
provide assistance in seeking support from a person with a legal
support obligation.1 0 6 Nevertheless, in a three-judge district court
intended to protect the state's coffers. The statute requires the state welfare administrator to
establish the primary obligation of a father to support his child and to consider this support
as one of the resources which the state can consider when determining AFDC eligibility. Id.
at 80.
101 See note 66 supra.
102 Although Congress may condition eligibility for assistance upon new and additional
requirements, as it did in the case of work requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(f) (Supp.
III, 1973), the NOLEO provisions were not intended to serve such a purpose. "Congress
ha[d] made no such provision in regard to NOLEO." Shirley v. Lavine, 365 F. Supp. 818,
824 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
103 No one has questioned, nor do we here, that Congress has the power to condition
eligibility for assistance upon new and additional requirements.
What the cases constrfiing the NOLEO provisions make clear, however, is that in
enacting them Congress did not utilize this power.
Id. at 822.
104 Id. at 824.
105 Judge Port recognized the instrumental part that the office of Commissioner of
Social Services Lavine played in the modification of HEW's interpretation:
The portion of the amendment permitting denial of assistance to parents or
caretakers refusing to cooperate in obtaining support from absent parents... was
prompted, we are advised by defendant Lavine's counsel, by requests sent by Lavine
and others to HEW. The amendment is a departure from the agency's past
position.
Id. at 823 (footnotes omitted).
106 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(b)(4)(ii) (1974).
decision, Shirley v. Lavine,10 7 New York's Social Services Law, which
provided the same sanction as was permitted under the new
federal regulation, 10 8 was held to violate the Social Security Act. In
his decision Judge Port reasoned that since it was not settled policy,
or consistent with past interpretations, "the agency's new interpre-
tation in [45 C.F.R. § 233.90] is in error and not a guidepost to be
followed judicially."'10 9 A number of other cases in 1974 struck
down similar laws and regulations which had cut off uncooperative
parents and caretakers from benefit payments.110
The Social Services Amendments of 1974 definitively resolved
this question of statutory interpretation. States may now clearly
compel the disclosure of information as a condition of AFDC
eligibility for a parent or caretaker. Although the Supreme Court
has recently affirmed Shirley,"' the passage of the new legislation
provides the states with a new tool to restrict the distribution of
AFDC benefits to a large group of individuals unless they are
willing to reveal intimate information to state officials.
Even with the issue of compulsory disclosure settled on a
statutory level, substantial constitutional issues have been raised
involving the right of privacy, the guarantee of equal protection,
and the privilege against self-incrimination. Doe v. Norton, 1 2 a 1973
district court case, touched on many of these issues in upholding a
Connecticut statute which compelled unwed mothers to disclose
the names of the fathers of their children and to prosecute pater-
nity actions against them under penalty of possible incarceration:
"[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' are included in this
guarantee of personal privacy.".. . Thus, the question presented
is whether an unwed mother's desire to keep secret the name of
her child's father is so "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" as to require constitutional protection." 3
Measured against this standard, the Norton court found that the
107 365 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1973),aff'd per curiam sub nom. Lascaris v. Shirley, 95 S.
Ct. 1190 (1975).
108 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 101-a (McKinney Supp. 1974).
109 365 F. Supp. at 824.
110 Doe v. Rampton, 497 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Gillman, 479 F.2d 646 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Burns v. Doe, 43 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. April 14, 1975)
(decided before Shirley but using the same rationale with respect to the statutory issues);
Messer v. Flowers, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 19,715 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 10, 1974); Doe v.
Flowers, 364 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. W. Va. 1973), affd mem., 416 U.S. 922 (1974).
"' Lascaris v. Shirley, 95 S. Ct. 1190 (1975).
112 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 415 U.S.
912 (1974) (No. 73-6033).
113 365 F. Supp. at 74, quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
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statute did not infringe any fundamental rights relating to privacy
because the relationship between an unwed mother and her
paramour was not deserving of the same protection granted to a
husband and a wife." 4 The invasion caused by the requirement in
Norton that a name merely be disclosed was not so great as to
violate any zone of privacy, since there was no intrusion into the
home and no effort to regulate the mother's conduct."15
Self-incrimination might arise from the compelled disclosure
of extramarital activities which are illegal in the state administering
the welfare program. Many states have laws against adultery,
fornication, and other illicit sexual behavior. 1 6 If a welfare recip-
ient who has an illegitimate child is compelled to disclose informa-
tion about that child's father, she may subject herself to prosecu-
tion. This issue has not been resolved, although the self-
incrimination claim was raised in one case. 17
The equal protection argument, initially raised in Norton, was
based on the claim that the Connecticut statute created two classes
of children-illegitimate and legitimate. This argument was
dismissed because the classifications were found to be rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose and created no invidious
discrimination. 118
114 Special recognition has been extended to the marital relationship. See, e.g., Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (law against giving information on contraception held to
violate the right to marital privacy).
115 365 F. Supp. at 77.
116 Most jurisdictions have statutes prohibiting adultery and fornication. Adultery is
generally defined as sexual intercourse between persons, one of whom is mafried to a third
person. Fornication generally involves illicit intercourse between unmarried persons. See,
e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1969).
117 The court in Doe v. Rampton, 497 F.2d 1032, 1033 (10th Cir. 1974), noted that a
mother might be compelled to reveal extramarital acts which constituted violations of Utah
law, but it did not reach the constitutional question.
118 365 F. Supp. at 78-84.
Even if, as the plaintiffs argue, the statute ought logically to be construed to
create a separate classification affecting only unwed mothers of illegitimate children
who receive some form of public assistance, that particular classification is directly
linked to the public interest the statute is designed to secure.
Id. at 82.
The court noted that the Supreme Court has consistently held that legislative discrimi-
nation to the disadvantage of illegitimate children must meet a showing that the state
interest in the classification was substantial; i.e., a strict scrutiny of the classification. Id. at 79
n.26. However, the court here found this statute operated to the benefit of illegitimates and
therefore it must merely be rationally related to some legitimate state purpose to avoid
violation of equal protection standards. Id. at 78-80. See also note 85 supra.
An argnment might be made that the statute is not, in fact, rationally related to the
purpose it was intended to serve. Establishing paternity and locating a missing parent do not
guarantee that such a parent will be able to provide support for his offspring. Therefore,
In 1974 the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in
Norton," 9 but it is possible that the Court will decide this case on
statutory rather than constitutional grounds.2 0 The district court
decision held that the Connecticut statute in question12 ' was not
inconsistent with the intention of the Social Security Act.' 22 Judge
Blumenfeld opined that the establishment of paternity determina-
tion was one of the substantial purposes behind the Social Security
Act.'2 3 While recognizing that it was also the purpose of the AFDC
program to protect and support needy children, the court held
that incarceration of an uncooperative mother did not necessarily
prevent the achievement of this goal. The decision emphasized that
incarceration was only a discretionary remedy; moreover, Judge
Blumenfeld relied heavily upon the following reasoning:
While the operation of this new statute may have the undesirable
effect of diminishing the amount of time that a recalcitrant
mother will be able to spend with her child, it does not deny to
either the mother or the child the benefits of food, clothing or
shelter in accordance with their needs.12 4
The Supreme Court, however, may find that such a disregard for
the recognized purpose of keeping a family intact and providing
parental care for needy children is frustrated when the parent is in
jail. A decision should be forthcoming this term.
Despite a clarified statutory scheme for compelled parental
disclosure of information and compelled cooperation, important
constitutional questions remain. Those who seek to apply laws like
Connecticut's will be left without guidelines to prevent intrusions
on constitutionally protected interests if the Supreme Court does
not speak to these issues.
the state cannot justify the withdrawal of a mother's benefits or her incarceration by linking
the disclosure of information with the automatic appearance of a support payment from the
missing parent. To do so would be tantamount to a presumption that locating a parent is
equivalent to obtaining money from him. See notes 20-55 and accompanying text supra for a
discussion of conclusive presumptions.
119 415 U.S. 912 (1974) (No. 73-6033).
120 "[Olur decision follows the Supreme Court's repeated direction that in such a case
we should adjudicate the statutory claim rather. than indulge in a constitutional ruling."
Shirley v. Lavine, 365 F. Supp. 818, 821 (N.D.N.Y. 1973). However, the presence of a
constitutional claim is crucial to obtaining a federal forum. See Note, The Outlook for Welfare
Litigation in the Federal Courts: Hagans v. Lavine & Edelman v. Jordan, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 897,
898-902 (1975).
121 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-440(b) (1973).
122 365 F. Supp. at 84.
123 Id. at 71.
124 Id. at 72.
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CONCLUSION
The year 1974 presented welfare recipients with a mixed
response on the state and federal level to pressures for reduced
AFDC expenditures. The trend toward efficiency and limitation of
benefits clashed with the desire to assist the genuinely needy to the
best of the government's ability. The tightening of procedures
designed to reduce fraud and error and the extension of the ability
to compel recipients to assist in the location of alternative sources
of support served to limit the breadth of the AFDC program. But
recipients were protected from administrative restrictiveness by the
requirement that only actually available income be utilized in
AFDC need determination. On balance, both Congress and the
courts resisted the extension of benefits to new classes, while still
requiring close attention to the needs of individual recipients.
Leslie J. Kelly
